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With the convening of the 35th General Assembly, the revision
of the present $10,000 maximum limit on recovery in a death action
in Colorado will undoubtedly be proposed and seriously considered.
It therefore seems appropriate to inquire at this time into the
nature of the Colorado Death Act and the reasons giving rise to
the statutory limit on recovery.
The present statutory law regarding damages recoverable in
death actions is found in Section 41-1-3, Colorado Revised Statutes
1953, and is in substantially the same form as when originally enacted in 1877,1 except for the raising of the maximum recovery
figure in 1951 from the original $5,000 to a maximum of $10,000,
and a provision requiring a plaintiff to elect between the penal
section of the death act relating to common carriers and the section
relating to death caused by negligence by persons in general. 2 Such
section provides in part as follows:
"in every such action the jury may give such damages as
they may deem fair and just, not exceeding ten thousand dollars, with reference to the necessary injury resulting from
such death, to the surviving parties, who may be entitled to
sue; and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attending any such wrongful act, neglect or
default."3
The cause of action created by our death act has been held by
the Colorado supreme court to be a separate and new action, and
not a survival of the cause of action held by the deceased prior to
his death. 4 This holding appears to be in conformity with the
I Colo. Sess. Laws 342 (1877).

2 Colo. Sess. Laws c. 148 § 3 (1951).
a Ibid.
4 Fish v Liley,120 Colo. 156, .208 P.2d 930 (1949).
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rulings of courts in other jurisdictions. As the action is created by
the death act itself, the court has noted that the elements of damage
are essentially different from those proper for consideration in the
personal injury action to which the deceased would have been
entitled if the death had not occurred.5
The various types of death acts have been classified into three
categories: (1) The more usual form of statute, whose purpose is
to compensate the survivors for the benefits which they would
have derived from the earning power of the deceased if his life
had not been cut short. (2) The type of death act whose purpose
is to enable the survivors to recover a sum determined by the
gravity of the defendant's fault in causing the death. (3) The type
of death act in which the recovery is treated as if the cause of
action were an asset of the deceased, and as if the decedent's cause
of action was in effect surviving to his representative.6 Our supreme court has always held that the recovery by the survivors
under our present death act is purely compensatory in nature and
does not allow any penal or punitive damages. 7 It is interesting to
note that the first Colorado Death Act, passed in 18728 vested the
cause of action in the personal representative of the deceased, and
prescribed absolutely no rule as to the measure of damages. This
1872 Act, during the brief five years of its existence, was construed
in effect to be the third type of Act, with the determination of the
amount of damages left almost completely up to the jury, which
had the right also to assess punitive damages.,
SURVIVING PARTIES
The language of the statute indicates that the damages must
be measured by the "necessary injury" to the surviving parties
who may be entitled to sue. The word "injury" is obviously not
used in its ordinary sense, but in this context has a broad meaning
synonymous with "loss" or "damages." As the word "injury" was
used in the original death act known as Lord Campbell's Act,
passed in 1846 in England, the use of such word in our Colorado
statute appears to be one of those historical carry-overs of language
that no longer conveys the same meaning as when originally used.
The Colorado act provides that the suit under the death act
may be brought by the husband or wife of the deceased, but further
provides that any judgment obtained in such action shall be owned
by such persons as are the heirs at law of the deceased under the
laws of descent and distribution, and shall be divided among such
heirs in the same manner as real estate is divided according to the
statute of descent and distribution.0 Accordingly, where a husband
is killed in an accident, the question arises as to whether the
measure of damages should be the compensation of the widow who
5 Id. at 160, 208 P.2d at 932.
( Restatement, Torts § 493 (1934).
7 Pierce v. Connors, 20 Colo. 178, 182, 37 Pac. 721, 722 (1894); Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo.
465, 30 Pac. 352 (1892); Moffatt v. Tenney, 17 Colo- 189, 30 Pac. 348 (1892).
8Colo. Sess. Laws 117 (1872).
q Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442 (1874).
In Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1-1 (1953).
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alone brings the suit, or should also include compensation for the
children of" such widow who will share in the recovery but who
are not "entitled to sue." A similar question would arise if the
surviving widow failed to sue within one year after the death of
her husband and during the second year her children filed such
suit. In such case the statute is unclear as to whether the widow
would share in any way in the recovery, and is similarly unclear as
to whether the measure of damages in such a suit would be the
loss on the part of the children, or the loss on the part of both the
children and the widow. These issues have not been decided by
our supreme court. However, in the case of Phillips v. Denver

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
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Tramway Co.,- the Colorado supreme court did review a judgment in favor of the Denver Tramway Company where the father
and mother of a deceased child brought suit under the death act.
The supreme court held that contributory negligence on the part
of the father was no bar to recovery by the mother of her one-half
interest in the death act claim. This decision, accordingly, would
tend to indicate that the damages under a death act suit should be
separately ascertained for each plaintiff.
INJURY
The "necessary injury" resulting from the death under our
Colorado death act has uniformly and repeatedly been held to be
the sum equal to the net pecuniary benefit which the plaintiff
might reasonably have expected to receive from the deceased if
the life of the deceased had not been terminated by the negligent
act of the defendant. 12 In a long line of decisions, the court has also
specifically stated that the Colorado act does not permit recovery
of any exemplary or punitive damages under its terms, or recovery
for the sorrow and grief of the plaintiffs, nor for their loss of the
society and companionship of the deceased." Our supreme court
has not specifically considered whether the loss of the personal
care, training and instruction of a parent would be considered a
',pecuniary benefit."
The form of the jury instructions to be given in accordance
with the above mentioned law has given the court no particular
difficulty, and specific instructions have been approved by the
Colorado supreme court. 1 4 However, where the plaintiffs have been
parents recovering for the loss of a child, the court has been faced
with the problem of the lack of any specific evidence of any net
pecuniary loss to the parents by reason of the child's death. Accordingly, on general legal principles, such judgments in favor of the
parents would seem to be open to challenge by way of a motion for a
directed verdict, or a motion to set aside any such judgment as
excessive under the evidence. This point was raised in the case
of St. Luke's Hospital Association v. Long,'1 and the Colorado supreme court disposed of the problem as follows:
"There was testimony that the boy was in good health and
the Court sustained objection of defendant to further evidence
along that line. It is impossible to establish with any definiteness or certainty the future earning ability of a three-year-old
boy or his future generosity toward his parents. To hold that
no recovery could be had in the absence of such showing would
be in effect to abolish the right to recovery by parents of
young children and such was not, we think, the Legislative
intent in the enactment of the statute." I
11 53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912).
12 Lehrer v. Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382 (1951); Pierce v. Connors, 20 Colo. 178, 37
Pa.. 721 (1894).
13 See e.g., McEntyre v. Jones, 128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313 (1953); Lehrer v. Lorenzen, supra
note 12.
14 E.g., McEntyre v. Jones, supro note 13; St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240
P.2d 917 (1952); Lehrer v. Lorenzen, supra note 13.
15 Supra

note 14.

in 125 Colo. at 33, 240 P.2d at 922.
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The court, in the St. Luke's Hospital Association case, thus
affirmed a verdict and judgment for $5,000 in favor of the parents
of a three-year-old boy, where the evidence showed merely that
the boy was in good health but nothing more as to his future earning ability, or the cost of supporting and educating him until the
completion of his schooling. Under similar reasoning, the Colorado
supreme court has affirmed a verdict and judgment in the sum of
$7,500 in the favor of the parents of a thirteen-year-old girl,17 and
a verdict and judgment in the sum of $10,000 in favor of the parents
of a nine-year-old daughter.'
In all three of these cases it is most evident that there was no
proof of any net pecuniary loss to the parents at all approaching
the amounts of the respective verdicts and judgments, even if the
alleged value of the services of the deceased children during their
minority were to be included in the figure. However, the Colorado
supreme court would undoubtedly have been subject to much criticism if it had literally followed the wording of its own decisions
and applied the same rules of evidence and requirements of proof
to the death actions as it has in other cases, for there most certainly is a general feeling that parents are entitled to recover something for the intense grief and sorrow resulting from the loss of
a child even though no specific pecuniary loss is actually proven.
Whatever the reasons or basis for such holdings, we do have
a situation in the state of Colorado where the jury instructions
limit the amount of the verdict to net pecuniary loss on the part
of the parties entitled to sue, but verdicts far in excess of any net
pecuniary loss proven by the parties are, without exceptions, upheld
by the courts as not excessive under such jury instructions. The
practical effect, of course, is to permit some recovery for sorrow,
grief, and loss of companionship while the language of the supreme
court decisions expressly forbids such a recovery. Every practicing
lawyer who has defended death act suits, particularly suits by
parents, is well aware that the net pecuniary loss in such an action
is almost unimportant, and that the reason juries in such cases
tend to bring in substantial verdicts is their desire to compensate
the bereaved parents for the sorrow arising from the loss of their
child.
MAXIMUM LIMIT OF RECOVERY
Various reasons have been given for the existence of a statutory
maximum limit to recovery under the death act. Some are historical
in nature, arising from the fact that the death act created an entirely new cause of action. The modern reasons given for such a
limit are (1) the difficulty of measuring damages arising by reason
of the wrongful death of a person, and (2) the possibility of extreme awards being made by juries due to the strong feelings of
sympathy aroused by such cases. 19
McEntyre v. Jcnes, 128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313 (1953).
18 Dawkins v. Chavez, 132 Colo. 61, 285 P.2d 821 (1955).
16 Am. Jur. 123, Death § 184 (1938).

17

19
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Before considering these stated reasons, it might be well to restate what to the writer is the fundamental and basic test as to
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of such a statutory limitation; i.e., whether or not such a limitation is fair and just to both
the plaintiff and the defendant. It is submitted that in the consideration of that question, the economic effects of raising or
eliminating the present $10,000 statutory limit of recovery under
the Colorado death act should not be allowed influence. Among
the economic effects which would follow the raising or elimination
of the statutory limit, and which would have a tendency to influence one or more groups of voters, are the following:
(1) Liability insurance companies would pay out more money
to individual plaintiffs, and thereby some "poor" people would be
helped.
(2) The loss ratios of the liability insurance companies would
tend to increase, thereby reducing their profits.
(3) Plaintiffs would tend to recover larger verdicts and judgments in death cases, thereby enabling plaintiffs' attorneys to secure larger fees.
(4) The higher verdicts and judgments in death cases would
tend to increase the loss ratios of liability insurance comnanies to
an extent which possibly could result in higher automobile insurance premiums for policyholders.
The elements of special damages provable in a death act case
certainly present similar problems of proof to those present in personal injury cases. Thus the proof of such items as loss of financial
support, funeral expense, loss of services, and loss of prospective
gifts or inheritance can presumably be as readily ascertained under
the evidence by a jury as are similar items of damages in personal
injury cases. However, when we come to the elements of grief.
sorrow, mental shock. and loss of companionship and society of a
wife. husband or child, we are faced with elements of damages
which theoretically are not permitted under our Colorado law and
regarding which no evidence can be or is produced in court for
the jury to consider. The general rule in Colorado is that mental
anguish alone, not arising from any physical injury to the plaintiff
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himself and caused solely by simple negligence, is not a basis
for an action for damages.2 0
However, as we have seen, in practice the items of grief, sorrow, mental anguish, and loss of companionship are the items
which actually cause the verdicts in suits under the Colorado death
act to be substantial even in cases where the special damages are
very low.
The difficulties inherent in any determination of the amount
of loss due to grief, sorrow, or mental anguish are aptly noted in
the early decision of Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Miller,21 where the
Colorado supreme court observed:
"It seems to be settled that no damages can be recovered
for the suffering which precedes the death. The grave bars
out this right; upon what known principle can the mental sufferings of the survivors be estimated. If the family is large,
and 'the grief proportional to its size, then the damages would
be immense. If the family was small, but the grief were boundless, how could it be compassed. How could a jury estimate
the relative mental anguish of a widow and twelve children.
Furthermore, it would involve a minute scrutiny into the personal relations of all parties. Affection would have to be
measured by a graduated scale. An account would have to be
taken of the familiarity which existed between the deceased
and the survivors.
"If a confirmed drunkard, or a person of vile associdtions,
the grief at his departure might not be so poignant.
"If the widow had wearied of her lord, or the husband of
his wife, death might be a joy instead of an anguish. How
determine the duration of this mental suffering or the degree
of its intensity? When a large number of survivors were
found, an inquiry would have to be instituted into the feelings
of each. This certainly might, in many instances, tend to scandals and disgrace. Neither the interests of the litigants nor
the policy of the law could be subserved by such a course. None
of these difficulties are encountered in estimating the mental
suffering in the case of one suing for direct injuries to himself;
20 Johnson v. Enlow, 132 Colo. 101, 286 P.2d 630 (1955).
21 2 Colo. 442 (1874).
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his relations to others are2 2in no sense material; it is a personal,
not a relative, suffering.

If some allowance is to be made in damages for such mental
anguish, grief, sorrow and loss of companionship on the part of
the survivors of the deceased, the allowance should be fixed or
controlled in some manner by statute, and not left up to a jury to
set on the basis of their emotions and sympathies and without any
relation to any legal evidence, evidence on these items being completely inadmissable even if offered.
In attempting to work out some reasonable and not completely
arbitrary solution to this unique problem, it seems apparent that
plaintiffs under the death act should be divided into two categories,
based upon the amount of special damages provable by them. Thus,
the widow or minor children of a deceased, in every case, have very
high provable special damages in the form of loss of substantial
financial support. The present $10,000 maximum limitation on recovery for such parties appears most unjust as their special damages
usually amount to far more than that figure independent of any
allowance whatsoever for mental anguish, grief, sorrow or loss of
companionship. However, adult and self-supporting children suing
by reason of the death of a parent, parents suing for damages by
reason of the death of a child, and a widower suing by reason of the
death of his wife in most cases have very little in the way of provable special damages. Such plaintiffs are actually basing their re.2

Id. at 465.
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covery almost entirely on the grief, sorrow, mental anguish and loss
of companionship elements of damage, and a statutory limit of
$10,000 as regards such plaintiffs does not appear to the writer to
be at all unreasonable.
In that connection, we must also consider the equities as regards the defendant, who must either personally or through his
insurer, pay such judgments. Any practicing attorney who has
participated in a suit involving a claim under the death act is well
aware that this type of action arouses the most intense sympathy
on the part of the jury for the bereaved parent, widow, or other
relative. After a photograph of the deceased has been shown to
the jury, and the surviving widow or parent while testifying from
the witness stand has broken into tears because of reliving the
tragic accident, the emotional factor becomes so great that an unfairly high verdict is all too apt to result. No matter what the size
of the verdict, under such conditions it is indeed difficult for it to
be based upon a calm and rational approach, and in this respect
this type of action is, in the writer's opinion, quite different from
a personal injury action.
CONCLUSION
It is the earnest hope of the writer that the unfair and unjust
$10,000 death act limitation as applied to widows and minor children will soon be raised to a reasonable and just figure by the
General Assembly. It is also the earnest hope of the writer that
the General Assembly will not go to the extreme of eliminating
all death act limitations as to maximum recovery, and that the
General Assembly will leave substantially unchanged the present $10,000 maximum recovery limitation as regards suits by adult
children for deaths of parents, parents for deaths of children, or
widowers for loss of wives because this limitation as applied to
these plaintiffs appears to be reasonable in view of the lack of any
substantial special damages provable by such plaintiffs.
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